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Abstract
We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology per-
spective, covering Condorcet’s (1785) classic theorem and several later refine-
ments and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises
featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve
as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i)
that there is a fundamental tension between voters’ independence and voters’
competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) that
the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many
jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (non-
asymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by
many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more
adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’.
1 Introduction
Jury theorems form the technical core of arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’, the
idea that large democratic decision-making bodies outperform small undemocratic
ones when it comes to identifying factually correct alternatives. The popularity
of jury theorems has spread across various disciplines such as economics, politi-
cal science, philosophy, and computer science. A ‘jury theorem’ is a mathematical
theorem about the probability of correctness of majority decisions between two al-
ternatives. The existence of an objectively correct (right, better) alternative is the
main metaphysical assumption underlying jury theorems. This involves an epis-
temic, outcome-based rather than purely procedural conception of democracy: the
goal of democratic decision-making is to ‘track the truth’, not to fairly represent
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people’s views or preferences (Cohen 1986). Typical jury theorems conclude that
‘crowds are wise’ in one or both of two senses:
The growing-reliability thesis: Larger groups are better truth-trackers. That
is, they are more likely to select the correct alternative (by majority) than
smaller groups or single individuals.
The infallibility thesis: Huge groups are infallible truth-trackers. That is, the
likelihood of a correct (majority) decision tends to full certainty as the group
becomes larger and larger.
Jury theorems differ considerably in their premises (axioms) about voters. They
often rest on two premises, an ‘independence’ axiom and a ‘competence’ axiom,
each of which may take various forms. For instance, the first of all jury theorems,
attributable to the French enlightenment philosopher and mathematician Nicolas
Marquis de Condorcet (1785), concludes that both of the aforementioned theses
hold, based on particularly simple premises:
Condorcet’s independence premise: The voters have independent probabilities
of voting for the correct alternative.
Condorcet’s competence premise: These probabilities exceed 1/2, and are the
same for all voters.
Following our analysis, the infallibility thesis emerges as incorrect in almost all real
applications. Worse, this thesis does not even seem helpful as an approximation,
idealization or paradigm of how large-scale democracy performs. It is fair to say
that those classical jury theorems which conclude that huge groups are infallible –
however beautiful they might be – have played a misleading role as a model of demo-
cratic decision making. Their overly optimistic conclusion has led the debate astray,
suggesting to some that the infallibility thesis might be true after all, while suggest-
ing to others that ‘something’ must be wrong with jury-theorem-based arguments in
general. Neither reaction is justified. We shall (i) pinpoint what goes wrong in (the
premises of) some naive jury theorems, and (ii) show how other jury theorems avoid
flawed premises. Non-naive jury theorems reach the growing-reliability conclusion,
but not the infallibility conclusion. This suggests that the growing-reliability thesis
is the more appropriate formal rendition of the wisdom of crowds. That thesis, by
itself, gives strong epistemic support for (majoritarian) democracy. The infallibility
thesis would have given additional support – but it is not tenable, and should be
taken off the agenda after having haunted the literature for decades.
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We shall give a selective review of jury theorems and our own critical assessment
of their suitability for formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. We begin with
a naive Condorcetian jury theorem (Section 2), which we then gradually refine into
jury theorems with more plausible premises (Sections 3–5). We then discuss further
jury theorems (Section 6), key objections (Section 7), and strategic voting (Section
8), before offering a concluding assessment (Section 9).
2 A naive jury theorem
We consider a group of individuals deciding by majority vote between two alter-
natives, such as to convict or acquit a defendant, or to keep or abolish a law. To
be able to vary the group size, we consider an infinite reservoir of individuals la-
belled i = 1, 2, ... and take the group of size n to consist of the first n individuals
1, ..., n. Each individual votes for exactly one alternative. The alternative receiving
more votes wins. To avoid ties, the group size n is throughout an odd number:
n ∈ {1, 3, 5, ...}.1 Exactly one of the alternatives is ‘correct’ or ‘better’ in an objec-
tive, voter-independent sense; it is called the unknown state (of the world).
We first state the jury theorem in a simple and common (yet as we shall see
problematic) version. The only model ingredients are events R1, R2, ... representing
correct voting by individuals 1, 2, ..., respectively. Alternatively, the model ingredi-
ents could be random variables v1,v2, ... representing the votes of individuals 1, 2, ...
and another random variable representing the true state, all ranging over the same
binary set of alternatives, e.g., the set {‘convict’, ‘acquit’}, or {‘abolish’, ‘keep’}, or
{0,1}; each correctness event Ri is then defined as the event that vi coincides with
the state.2
We are ready to state the simple Condorcetian jury theorem, beginning with its
two axioms (e.g., Grofman et al. 1983).
Unconditional independence (UI): The correctness events R1, R2, ... are (un-
conditionally) independent.
Unconditional competence (UC): The (unconditional) correctness probability
p = P (Ri), the (unconditional) competence, (i) exceeds 1/2 and (ii) is the same for
each voter i.
1One could work without excluding even n, by assuming that ties are broken using a fair coin.
2Events and random variables are of course defined relative to a background probability space,
i.e., a set of possible worlds Ω, a notion of ‘events’ (one could count all subsets of Ω as events, or,
more generally, all subsets in a given σ-algebra of subsets), and a probability function P defined on
the set of events. We shall never mention the probability space explicitly as a model ingredient.
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Theorem 1. Assume UI and UC. As the group size increases, the probability of a
correct majority3 (i) increases4 (growing reliability), and (ii) tends to one (infalli-
bility).
Mathematically, the infallibility conclusion is an easy consequence of the law
of large numbers, which implies that, under UI and UC, as the group size tends
to infinity, the correctness proportion converges to the correctness probability p =
P (Ri) (with probability one), so that the probability of a correct majority tends to
one. The growing-reliability conclusion is harder to prove.5
3 A state-sensitive jury theorem
The independence assumption UI is highly problematic, even if voters do not com-
municate with each other. Why? This section explains one of the problems, and
presents a jury theorem that fixes it (other problems are addressed in Sections 4
and 5). Binary decision problems often display an asymmetry between the alterna-
tives: one alternative is simpler to identify as correct than the other one. Guilt of
a defendant might be easier to detect than innocence, or vice versa; global warming
might be easier to detect than its absence, or vice versa; and so on. This sort of
truth-tracking asymmetry is the rule, not the exception. It renders the event Ri that
individual i identifies the state positively correlated with the event of the simpler-
to-identify state, because correct voting is more likely given the simpler-to-identify
state than given the harder-to-identify state. For example, if guilt is simpler to
identify than innocence, a juror is more likely to get it right given guilt than given
innocence. As all correctness events R1, R2, ... correlate positively with the same
event (of the simpler-to-identify state), they normally correlate positively with one
another.6 So UI is violated.
This problem of correlation ‘via’ the state can be avoided by holding the state
fixed, that means, conditionalizing on the state. We first enrich Section 2’s model by
another ingredient: a random variable x, interpreted in this section as the state, i.e.,
3This is the probability that the number of individuals i ∈ {1, ..., n} such that Ri obtains exceeds
n/2.
4Throughout, ‘increases’ is used in its weak sense. In fact, the increase in Theorem 1 is strict,
provided the correctness events Ri do not have probability one. In the other theorems stated the
increase is also strict, except for extreme cases.
5The proof relies on a recursive formula for the probability of a correct majority as a function
of n. This formula is stated in Grofman et al. (1983), but its proof is hard to find (see however
Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013a, Step 2 in Appendix C).
6We say ‘normally’ rather than ‘necessarily’ since there are some far-fetched mathematical coun-
terexamples.
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the correct alternative.7 Formally speaking, nothing hinges on this interpretation of
x which could be almost any random variable.8
We can now revise the axioms and theorem as follows.
Conditional Independence (CI): The correctness events R1, R2, ... (or equiva-
lently the votes v1,v2, ...
9) are independent conditional on any value of x.
Conditional Competence (CC): For any value x of x, the conditional correctness
probability px = P (Ri|x), the competence (conditional on x), (i) exceeds 1/2 and
(ii) is the same for all voters i (but may vary with x).
Theorem 2. Assume CI and CC. As the group size increases, the probability of a
correct majority (i) increases (growing reliability), and (ii) tends to one (infallibil-
ity).
This jury theorem reaches the same conclusions as Theorem 1, but on the basis
of ‘state-conditional’ axioms. The state x with higher competence px (if it exists) is
the easier-to-identify state discussed at the start of the section.
4 The fundamental tension between independence and
competence
Different votes can be correlated via the objective state they track – a problem
solved above by working with the independence axiom CI rather than UI, thereby
fixing the state and blocking the correlation via the state. Unfortunately, votes
can also be correlated via several other circumstances. So fixing just the state –
the most common form of conditionalization in the literature – does not yet secure
independence (Dietrich and List 2004, Dietrich 2008, Dietrich and Spiekermann
2013a; see also Ladha 1992, 1995). Any common cause of votes is a potential
7Recall that Section 2’s initial model has as ingredients the correctness events R1, R2, ..., or
alternatively the votes v1,v2, ... and a state variable (with Ri then defined as the event that vi
matches the state). If we adopt the alternative ingredients and if the new ingredient x is itself the
state (following our current interpretation), then the initial model already contains x and need not
be extended.
8x could take any sort of values, with the only constraining assumption that each value has
positive probability in order to render conditionalization meaningful. This implies that x is a
discrete random variable, i.e., takes only finitely or countably infinitely many values. (Everything
could be generalized to possibly continuous x.)
9The equivalent formulation in terms of votes assumes that x is or more generally subsumes
(determines) the state, an assumption in line with our current and later interpretations of x. Under
this assumption, the equivalence holds since Ri and vi are then interdefinable given x: Ri holds if
and only if vi matches the state determined by x.
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source of dependence. Consider common evidence, such as, in a court case, witness
reports and the defendant’s facial expression, or, among scientists, experimental
data. Evidence may or may not support the truth: it may be truth-conducive
or misleading. For instance, the defendant’s friendly facial expression presumably
supports innocence and is misleading in case of guilt. Plausibly, the correctness
events R1, R2, ... correlate positively with the event of truth-conducive (i.e., non-
misleading) common evidence, and thereby correlate positively with one another.
Voters can also be influenced by common causes that are non-evidential such as
distracting heat: such causes lack an objective bearing on the true state, and yet
they influence people’s epistemic performance and thereby threaten independence.
Jurors are more likely to vote well in agreeable room temperature; votes are thus
correlated via room temperature.10
The strategy to restore independence should by now be familiar: one should
conditionalize on the common causes of votes. So we now reinterpret the variable
x on which we conditionalize in axioms as representing not just the state, but in
addition all common causes of votes, the ‘circumstances’. In the terminology of
Dietrich (2008) and Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013a), x represents the specific
decision problem faced by the group. For such x, axiom CI becomes plausible. Have
we thus rehabilitated Theorem 2 as a formal argument for the ‘wisdom of crowds’?
Unfortunately not, because our rich interpretation of x renders the competence
axiom CC implausible. Why?
Generally, whether a voter is competent – i.e., more often right than wrong
– depends on the reference class considered. Plausibly, a voter is more often right
than wrong among all conceivable yes/no questions, or all guilty/innocent questions.
While competent within such an all-encompassing reference class, a voter is presum-
ably not competent within a reference class in which certain misleading evidence is
always present, such as all guilty/innocent questions where the defendant is guilty
even though he has an alibi. Once we conditionalize on the full decision problem,
we fine-grain the reference classes and effectively randomize only over parameters
other than the state, common evidence, and other common causes.11 Just imagine
a decision problem (a value of x) characterized by severely misleading evidence, say
a decision problem in which an innocent defendant unluckily looks exactly like the
true murderer captured on CCTV. In this reference class a juror will be incompe-
tent: within it he will get it right only rarely, e.g., when inattentive to (misleading)
10Common causes, whether evidential or non-evidential, threaten not just unconditional inde-
pendence UI but also state-conditional independence since the correlations do not disappear by
conditionalizing on the state.
11What can still vary is, say, the voter’s level of awakeness, attention, hunger, or back pain, all of
which may indeed influence the voter’s truth-tracking ability and hence his correctness probability.
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evidence. Most court cases (or decision problems) are not of this unfortunate kind:
most have mainly truth-conducive evidence. So the voter is more often right than
wrong across a wider cross-problem reference class. This observation is, however,
irrelevant for the problem-conditional competence axiom CC, which conditionalizes
on a specific decision problem rather than ‘averaging out’ the unlucky cases of mis-
leading evidence.
Ironically, the problem-conditional notion of probability renders independence
(CI) defensible but competence (CC) unjustified, whereas a cross-problem-randomizing
notion of probability – whether Section 2’s unconditional or Section 3’s state-conditional
notion – renders competence (UC or CC) more justified but independence (UI or CI)
implausible. So, Theorems 1’s and 2’s premises are not jointly justifiable, regardless
of how much we conditionalize on or ‘pack’ into x. The following table summarizes
this dilemma.12
unconditional state-conditional problem-conditional
independence
axiom
UI
implausible
CI for x = state
implausible
CI for x = problem
plausible
competence
axiom
UC
plausible in
homog. groups
CC for x = state
plausible in
homog. groups
CC for x = problem
implausible
5 A problem-sensitive jury theorem
Following the previous section, we interpret the variable x as capturing the group’s
specific decision problem, including the common causes of voters. So the indepen-
dence axiom CI is plausible, but the competence axiom CC is untenable. It is tempt-
ing to replace CC by the unconditional competence axiom UC, but unfortunately
the combination of CI and UC – two potentially justified premises – does not lend it-
self to a jury theorem: it does not imply the growing-reliability thesis. We therefore
weaken CC to a more plausible axiom: tendency to competence. Stating this axiom
12An altogether different approach avoids the need of conditionalizing on the decision problem
and defends the independence axiom in its unconditional form UI by interpreting probabilities
differently in the first place: the probabilities captured by the function P are now taken to already
incorporate (be ‘posterior on’) the decision problem. The state and the common causes are thus
fixed rather than drawn randomly. This interpretation of probability turns Theorem 1 into Dietrich’s
(2008) fixed-problem jury theorem. Theorem 1’s independence axiom UI is now justified, but its
competence axiom UC is no longer justified. The problem is not that UC must fail, but that it
is unknown whether it holds: since the fixed state is unknown, so is the question of whether the
fixed problem has truth-conducive or misleading circumstances. So the alternative interpretation
of probability also fails to render Theorem 1’s premises jointly justified. We shall not adopt this
interpretation.
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Figure 1: Example of Tendency to Competence.
requires a short preparation. A voter i’s problem-specific competence px = P (Ri|x)
depends on the (randomly drawn) problem x, and is thus itself a random variable.
Its value is above 1/2 for ‘easy’ problems (values of x), and below 1/2 for ‘difficult’
problems with misleading evidence or other epistemically harmful circumstances. A
discrete real-valued random variable, in our case the competence variable, tends to
exceed 1/2 if the value 1/2 +  is at least as probable as the symmetrically opposed
value 1/2 − , and this for all  > 0. An illustration is given in Figure 1.13 Here
the competence level is for, instance, more likely to be 0.7 = 0.5 + 0.2 than to be
0.3 = 0.5−0.2. This and all other symmetrical comparisons are indicated by dashed
lines.
Tendency to Competence (TC): A voter i’s competence px = P (Ri|x) (as a
function of x) (i) tends to exceed 1/2, and (ii) is the same for all voters i.
Axiom TC weakens CC: it retains CC’s homogeneity part, but weakens CC’s first
part by allowing voters to sometimes be incompetent. By using TC rather than the
implausible axiom of CC, we no longer reach the implausible infallibility conclusion,
while retaining the growing-reliability conclusion (Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013a):
Theorem 3. Assume CI and TC. As the group size increases, the probability of a
correct majority (i) increases (growing reliability), and (ii) tends to a value which is
below 1 (no infallibility) unless CC holds.14
13We thank the developers of the open source matplotlib library.
14To disambiguate, ‘unless’ means ‘if and only if it is not the case that’. See Dietrich and Spieker-
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This theorem gives group deliberation and communication a new role. Classical
jury theorems suggest that deliberation might be harmful by threatening indepen-
dence (e.g. Anderson 2006, Rawls 1971, pp. 314-5). But deliberation does not
undermine the new problem-conditional independence axiom CI: insofar as delib-
eration leads to information exchange and hence to additional common evidence,
this common evidence is incorporated into the decision problem, so that common-
evidence-caused correlations are automatically ‘conditionalized away’. Instead, de-
liberation is beneficial: it ideally renders voters more competent15 and thereby the
group’s majority judgment more reliable.
6 Further jury theorems
In this section we provide a short, non-exhaustive overview of other jury theorems
(setting aside the sort of concerns raised above, although they still apply). The
most frequent starting point is the classic Theorem 1, in which either axiom could
be weakened.
Weakening axiom UC by simply dropping its homogeneity condition, hence al-
lowing voter-specific competence pi = P (Ri), has dramatic consequences: neither
the growing-reliability nor the infallibility thesis still follows. Instead the probability
of a correct majority can decrease in group size and converge to 1/2, so that huge
groups are as bad as a fair coin. This happens if the sequence of competence levels
p1, p2, ... strictly decreases towards 1/2, so rapidly that newly added voters are much
less competent than existing voters and thereby pull the majority’s reliability down
(Paroush 1998). Some restriction on how competence varies across voters is thus
needed for any ‘wisdom of crowds’ conclusion. One could weaken UC either to the
condition that all pi exceed 1/2 +  for a voter-independent  > 0 (Paroush 1998),
or to the condition that average competence 1n
∑n
i=1 pi converges to a value above
1/2 (Dietrich 2008; for related or more general results, see Berend and Paroush
1998 and Owen et al. 1989). This preserves the infallibility conclusion, but not
the growing-reliability conclusion – the ‘wrong’ conclusion is preserved, one might
complain. Alternatively, one no longer assumes fixed identity of voters but draws
the group of any given size n randomly from a given huge (finite) pool of potential
voters i with competence levels pi > 1/2. The probability of a correct majority vote
mann (2013a) for the generalization to possibly non-discrete x, and for a version of the result which
concludes that the group’s performance increases strictly (something achieved by strengthening TC
through using a strict notion of ‘tendency to exceed 1/2’).
15A voter’s problem-specific competence px presumably tends to exceed 1/2 more strongly for a
‘post-deliberation decision problem’ x enriched by new common evidence than for a ‘no-deliberation
decision problem’ x with less or no common evidence.
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is then doubly random: the identity of the voters and their votes are random. The
growing-reliability conclusion is then restored (Berend and Sapir 2005).
The other candidate for modification is the independence axiom. Boland (1989)
and Boland et al. (1989), for example, discuss the influence of an opinion leader. Be-
fore the opinion leader is consulted, voters’ judgments obey UI and UC. Each voter
(other than the opinion leader) has the same independent probability of following
the opinion leader in his vote; votes thus violate UI. The infallibility conclusion is
still reached if (and only if) the probability of following is not too high, specifically
below 1− 12p (see also Goodin and Spiekermann 2012). There are many other ways
to adapt or weaken independence. For instance, some jury theorems assume votes
to be interchangeable rather than independent, giving up the infallibility conclu-
sion (Ladha 1993, Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013a); others are based on causal
networks, again giving up infallibility (Dietrich and List 2004, Dietrich and Spieker-
mann 2013b); Kaniovski (2010) analyses the group’s reliability as a function of the
dependence structure among voters; and Pivato (2016) shows that the infallibility
conclusion is still reachable under surprisingly strong forms of dependence, using
suitable voting rules.
List and Goodin (2001) importantly generalize Theorem 2’s infallibility conclu-
sion to the case of k ≥ 2 options, still assuming one option is correct. They generalize
CC: given the correct option x, a voter is more likely to vote for x than for y, and
this for every incorrect option y. Interestingly, the probability of correct voting
no longer needs to exceed 1/2 for k > 2 options. It can be conjectured that the
growing-reliability conclusion also generalizes to k ≥ 2 options. The upshot is that
jury theorems and ‘wisdom of crowds’ arguments need not be restricted to binary
decision problems.
Going beyond majority voting, some work asks which voting rule is epistemically
optimal, where ‘optimality’ could be cashed out differently, e.g., by maximizing the
probability of a correct outcome (e.g., Nitzan and Paroush 1982, Shapley and Grof-
man 1984, Ben-Yashar and Nitzan 1997, Dietrich 2006, Pivato 2013). The generic
finding is that, under an independence axiom of type UI or CI, the optimal rule is
a weighted super-, sub- or simple majority rule in which a voter’s weight is a well-
defined function of his competence (and becomes negative in case of incompetence).
Simple majority rule is optimal in case of equal competence and symmetric options.
7 Objections and replies
One objection is David Estlund’s ‘disjunction problem’ (Estlund 2008, p. 228-30).
We give a new reconstruction of the problem, showing its appeal but also its limits.
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In a choice, say between building a roadbridge or a footbridge, each option is a
disjunction of several finer sub-options. For instance, a roadbridge might have one,
two or more lanes, and might or might not have street lights and plants. Alterna-
tively, the voters could decide between a specific roadbridge (say one with 2 lanes,
no street lights, but plants) or any other road- or footbridge. The first option has
become finer, the second coarser.16 The change in options may considerably alter a
voter’s pair of state-conditional competence levels (the correct-voting probabilities
given correctness of the first or second option). This by itself is not a problem, but
just a feature, we maintain. What is a problem is the following. If one option is
much more specific than the other, then a voter’s conditional competence may easily
be below 1/2 given the specific state of the world (and close to 1 given the unspecific
state). For correctness of a highly specific option is often subjectively unlikely, hence
not recognized – just as it seems unlikely that you ate exactly 139 corn flakes this
morning, even if you did. This argument threatens the plausibility of the compe-
tence axiom CC, but only for decision problems whose options are highly unequal in
specificity. Also, the competence axioms UC and TC remain plausible.17 Since Es-
tlund neither distinguishes between conditional and unconditional competence nor
explicitly restricts the scope of the problem, his objection is overstated.
The disjunction problem is not the only objection raised against competence ax-
ioms. Some scholars question competence on empirical grounds. There is, however,
one theoretical argument against systematic incompetence: systematically worse-
than-random judgments are unstable, since once a voter becomes aware of his incom-
petence he can normally achieve competence by simply reversing all of his judgments
(Dietrich 2008, Goodin and Spiekermann 2012).
Another frequent objection is that jury theorems invoke variables whose exact
nature is unknown in practice. One usually knows neither exact competence levels
nor the precise nature and distribution of the decision problem x in Theorem 3, as
the precise common causes are unknown. However, accepting a competence axiom
(UC, CC or TC) only requires ascertaining some inequalities, without having to
know the exact behaviour of the variables involved.
Finally, on the most fundamental level, some critics suggest that there often is
no truth to be tracked (e.g. Miller 1992, p. 56, Black 1958, p. 163). For instance,
it is sometimes claimed that there is no objective truth in political choices, which
are supposedly not about facts but about values or preferences. Whether this is so
16Presumably the new first option, the specific roadbridge, can be the correct option only if the
old first option, the unspecific roadbridge, was the correct option.
17Regarding UC, a voter is unconditionally likely to vote correctly since he is likely to believe the
unspecific option is correct and since that option is itself likely to be correct. It is only conditional
on correctness of the specific option that the voter is likely to get it wrong.
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arguably depends on how the question is asked (Landemore 2013, ch. 8). Asking
British voters whether they “prefer” the United Kingdom (UK) to remain in the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) suggests a non-epistemic preference elicitation. Asking whether
EU membership is “better” or “better for the UK” seems to ask two (different)
epistemically framed questions. In fact, the question in the EU referendum on 23
June 2016 was whether the UK “should” remain in or leave the EU. Whether this
is an epistemic issue, i.e., whether there is a fact about what the UK “should” do,
depends on how one interprets “should” and on meta-ethical commitments.
An interesting hybrid view is that, while there is an objective fact, it is a group-
specific fact about which option is preferred by the majority, i.e., the “will of the
majority”. The question then is: does a voter vote according to his own preference,
or according to his belief about the majority preference? In the latter case, the
standard jury-theorem setup directly applies. In the former case, majority outcomes
may seem to be correct by definition. But, on a more sophisticated version of the
view, a voter can be mistaken about his own true preference, so that his vote tracks
a voter-specific truth about his preference. Under plausible conditions, large groups
are likely to track the majority preference (Miller 1986, Goldman 1999, p. 323ff,
Goodin and Spiekermann 2015, List and Spiekermann forthcoming).
8 Strategic voting
It is well-known that conflicts of interests between voters may lead to strategic
incentives. Surprisingly, strategic voting may also occur in purely epistemic contexts
where voters share the common goal of objectively correct group decisions; this
insight has sparked a large and active literature, particularly among economists
(Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1999, Peleg and Zamir
2012, Bozbay, Peters and Dietrich 2014, among many others). We only sketch
the basic idea. Suppose you are one of 11 jurors voting on whether to convict
the defendant. Your private information suggests guilt. Should you vote ‘convict’?
Strategically, your vote should be chosen on the assumption that it makes a difference
(is ‘pivotal’); so that 5 other jurors vote ‘convict’ and 5 vote ‘acquit’. In any other
situation your vote would be irrelevant for the outcome and can therefore be ignored.
Hence, after adding the hypothetical information about other voters to your own
information, ‘convict’ is supported 6 times, and ‘acquit’ 5 times. This is almost an
informational tie, which (let’s assume) does not justify conviction. You should vote
‘acquit’, although your private information alone suggests conviction. Paradoxically,
if every voter reasons like this, all jurors vote to acquit even when they all hold
private information suggesting guilt. In game-theoretic terms, truthful voting may
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be irrational, and the situation that everyone votes truthfully may fail to be a (Bayes-
Nash) equilibrium of the voting game.18 A key goal of this literature is to determine
the (often non-majoritarian) voting rules which render truthful voting rational and
generate efficient decisions in light of all information spread across voters.
But will voters really engage in such strategic reasoning? The reasoning depends
on an extreme motivational assumption: voters care exclusively about the correct-
ness of group outcomes. The rationality of non-truthful voting breaks down quickly
as the voter’s motivation is enriched by an intrinsic concern for the truthfulness
of his own vote, in addition to the concern for the group outcome. For the ex-
pressive part of a voter’s motivation quickly crowds out the outcome-driven part as
the probability of pivotality is usually very small. Besides, even voters with purely
outcome-oriented preferences might lack the strategic sophistication for engaging in
strategic voting.
9 Concluding assessment
Whether jury theorems are useful for social epistemology and democratic theory
is highly controversial. To see clearly through the large variety of proposed theo-
rems, approaches, and objections, we have classified and evaluated theorems based
on their premises and their conclusions. Theorems usually make independence and
competence assumptions about voters’ correct-voting probabilities; the core ques-
tion is how these probabilities are understood. Probabilities could be unconditional
(Theorem 1), conditional on the state (Theorem 2), or conditional on the full deci-
sion problem which includes not just the state but also the common causes of votes
(Theorem 3).
Our analysis shows that there is a fundamental tension between independence
and competence premises: independence is plausible only for a rich conditionaliza-
tion, whereas competence is only plausible for a thin conditionalization. Indeed,
independence is untenable when construed unconditionally or state-conditionally;
but competence is untenable when construed problem-conditionally. As a result,
classical jury theorems fail to have jointly justified premises, which is responsible
for their (implausible) conclusion that huge groups are infallible. Our suggested
response is to use a rich (problem-conditional) conditionalization, while weakening
the competence axiom to tendency to competence: voters are more often competent
than incompetent rather than always competent. The resulting jury theorem no
longer concludes that huge groups are infallible; but it still concludes that larger
18In voting, voters effectively play a strategic game with asymmetric information and common
preferences (for objectively correct outcomes).
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groups perform better, thereby giving support for majoritarian democracy.
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